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TORTS - SUCCESSOR CORPORA TIONS - DEFECTIVE 
PRODUCTS - CAN THE LAW AND POLICIES OF STRICT 
LIABILITY BE RECONCILED WITH CORPORATE LAW 
POLICIES WHICH PROTECT SUCCESSOR 
CORPORATIONS IN ORDER TO RESPOND FAIRLY TO 
THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY PLAINTIFF? Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 
613, 594 A.2d 564 (1991) (4-2 decision). 
The issue of successor liability in a products liability case involves 
questions of both corporate law and strict liability. In this field, a 
corporation that acquires the assets of another corporation generally 
does not assume the debts and liabilities of the predecessor. 1 The 
recognized exceptions to the general rule of successor nonliability, 
however, were developed to protect creditors and shareholders with-
out regard for the interests of products liability plaintiffs. 2 Because 
traditional corporate law principles do not adequately address the 
issues presented by tort victims, courts and commentators have 
considered new rules which expand the traditional exceptions.3 One 
such rule is the continuity of enterprise theory, under which liability 
is imposed based on a continuation of the business of the predecessor 
corporation, absent any continuation in ownership.4 In Nissen Corp. 
v. Miller,s the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether it 
should adopt the general rule of successor non liability with its four 
recognized exceptions6 or whether it should add a fifth exception for 
continuity of enterprise when determining successor liability in a strict 
products liability case.7 
In July 1981, Nissen Corporation bought the trade name, pat-
ents, inventory and other assets of the American Tredex Corporation.8 
1. See Liability of Successor for Injury Caused by Product of Predecessor, 
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D, Nov. 1990, § 7:1, at 10-12 [here-
inafter Liability of Successor]. . 
2. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 1986). The general 
rule, with its four commonly recognized exceptions, "protects creditors and 
dissenting shareholders, and facilitates determination of tax responsibilities, 
while promoting free alienability of business assets." Id. 
3. See Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987, 990-91 (D. Md. 1988) 
(discussing product line theory and continuing liability doctrine in the tort 
context). 
4. LOUIS FRUMER & MELVIN FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.06[3] (1989); 
Liability of Successor, supra note 1, §§ 7:19 to 7:24. 
5. 323 Md. 613, 594 A.2d 564 (1991). 
6. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
7. Nissen, 323 Md. at 617, 594 A.2d at 565. 
8. Id. at 615, 594 A.2d at 565. 
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American Tredex retained all accounts receivable arising from sales 
shipped prior to the purchase date.9 A written agreement indicated 
the intent on the part of Nissen to substantially continue the business 
of American Tredex, although American Tredex was to remain in 
business. for five years after the transaction. JO The purchase contract 
expressly excluded assumption of liability for injuries arising from 
any product previously sold by American Tredex.1l The contract 
called for a payment of $600,000 on execution and· a fee of four 
percent of net sales for the following five year period. 12 Nissen 
retained some American Tredex employees, although it was not 
contractually obligated to do so. Nissen moved the business from 
Indiana to Iowa, and continued to sell replacement parts for equip-
ment sold by American Tredex before the transfer .13 
In October 1986, more than five years after Nissen's asset 
purchase, a consumer was injured on a treadmill he had purchased 
from American Tredex in January 1981. Nearly two years later, in 
September 1988, the consumer sued both American Tredex and 
Nissen. 14 At the time suit was filed, American Tredex was adminis-
tratively dissolved. IS 
In reversing the judgment of the court of special appeals and 
affirming the award of summary judgment for Nissen, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland adopted the general rule of successor nonlia-
bility, with its four traditional exceptions; and rejected the continuity 
of enterprise theory. This decision may leave some products liability 
plaintiffs without a remedy, but it also soundly confirms Maryland's 
strict liability policy which requires fault on the part of the seller or 
manufacturer in order to impose tort liability.16 
The general rule of successor corporation liability is: 
[A] corporation which acquires all or part of the assets of 
another corporation does not acquire the liabilities and debts 
9. Id. at 615-16, 594 A.2d at 565. 
10. Id. at 615, 594 A.2d at 565. DUring the five year period for which the seller 




13. Id. at 616, 594 A.2d at 565. 
14. Id. The suit also named as defendants AT Corporation and Atlantic Fitness 
Products, the retailer from whom the consumer had purchased the treadmill. 
Id. 
15. Id. 
16. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 351-52, 363 A.2d 955, 963 
(1976). 
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of the predecessor unless: (1) there is an express or implied 
agreement to assume the liabilities; (2) the transaction 
amounts to a consolidation or merger; (3) the successor 
entity is a mere continuation or reincarnation of the pred-
ecessor entity; or (4) the transaction was fraudulent, not 
made in good faith, or made without sufficient considera-
tionY 
149 
Before Nissen, the first, second, and fourth exceptions delineated 
above had been codified in the Corporations and Associations Article 
of the Maryland Annotated Code. 18 Although the "mere continua-
17. [d. at 617,594 A.2d at 565-66 (quoting Liability of Successor, supra note I, 
§ 7:1 at 10-11). See also Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 
282,290, 562 A.2d 1286, 1289-90 (1989) (discussing the general rule of corporate 
liability when a corporation acquires the assets of another corporation); 15 
WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRfVATE COR-
PORATIONS §§ 7122, 7123.05 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (examining general rule 
of corporate liability, in the products liability context, when there is mere 
purchase or acquisition of another company's property); FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 4, § 2.06(2) (defining general rule of successor liability). 
18. In regard to the express agreement exception, Maryland's Corporations and 
Associations Code "provides that a successor corporation is liable for all the 
debts and obligations of the transferor to the extent provided in the articles 
of transfer." Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 291, 562 
A.2d 1286, 1290 (1989) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 3-
115(c)(I) (1993». When no articles of transfer are filed, the sales agreement is 
treated. as "equivalent to the articles of transfer." [d. at 292, 562 A.2d at 
1291. See also MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 1-IOI(c) (1993) (defining 
articles of transfer as "articles of sales"). 
In determining implied assumption of liability by a successor corporation, 
consideration of the following factors is suggested: 
(a) "[T]he effect of the transfer on the predecessor's creditors," 
Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 834, 839 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); 
(b) any "[a]dmission of liability by officers or spokespersons of 
the successor corporation," id. at 840; 
(c) fact that successor voluntarily pays some debts of predecessor 
does not necessarily signify assumption of predecessor's debts, see 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 175 A. 295, 
296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1934); and 
(d) by continuing to perform the predecessor's contracts, the 
successor demonstrates intent to assume liability under the contracts, 
Automatic Retailers of America, Inc. v. Evans Cigarette Servo Co., 
269 Md. 101, 106-07, 304 A.2d 581, 584-85 (1973) (citing R.E.C. 
Management Corp. V. Bakst Serv., Inc., 265 Md. 238, 289 A.2d 285 
(1972». 
In regard to the consolidation or merger exception, Maryland's Corpora-
tions and Associations Code "provides ... that '[t]he successor is liable for 
all the debts and obligations of each nonsurviving corporation.'" Baltimore 
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tion" exception is not codified, the policy behind this exception 
permeates the Corporations and Associations and Commercial Law 
Articles. 19 The codified policy seeks to protect the rights of creditors 
whenever there is a transfer of assets.20 As noted by the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, "[t]he 'mere continuation' exception 
reinforces this policy by allowing a creditor to recover from the 
successor corporation whenever the successor is substantially the same 
as the predecessor.' '21 
Underlying the four traditional exceptions is a policy to protect 
creditors and shareholders by preventing the predecessor from escap-
ing liabilities and obligations by changing form but not substance. 22 
Like Maryland, the majority of states recognizes only the four 
traditional exceptions to the general rule 0 f successor nonliability. 23 
Many courts have refused to expand successor liability where there 
is no causal relationship between the successor corporation's acts and 
a consumer's injuries.24 Because the successor corporation neither 
Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 290, 562 A.2d at 1290 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., 
CORPS. & ASS'NS § 3-114(e)(I) (1993». 
In regard to the fraudulent transfer exception, Maryland's Uniform Fraud-
ulent Conveyance Act, codified in MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW n §§ 15-201 
to 15-214, protects the creditors of a transferor by allowing them to levy on 
property conveyed to a transferee if the transfer was made with the intent to 
defraud or without fair consideration. Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 
290-91, 562 A.2d at 1290 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II §§ 15-201 to 
15-214 (1990». See also Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 
1446, 1449 (D. Md. 1988) (stating that "the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act . . . protects the rights of creditors of a corporation which 
transfers its assets with an intent to defraud or without fair consideration in 
a manner similar to the [fraudulent conveyance] exception"). 
19. Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 297, 562 A.2d at 1293. See, e.g., MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 3-114 to 3-115 (1993); Maryland Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW n, §§ 15-201 to 15-
214 (1990); Maryland Bulk Transfers Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I, §§ 
6-101 to 6-111 (1993). 
20. Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 297, 562 A.2d at 1293. 
21. Id. The indicia of mere continuation include: common officers, directors and 
stockholders between successor and predecessor; only one corporation exists 
after completion of the sale of assets; continuation by purchaser of seller's 
business practices and policies; sufficient consideration running to seller cor-
poration in light of assets being sold. Id. 
22.Id. 
23. See Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613,632-33,594 A.2d 564, 573-74 (1991) 
(citing Florom v. Elliot Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Colorado 
law); Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(applying Kentucky law); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 
1981) (applying Missouri law); Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. Supp. 
1619 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 
Inc., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982) (applying Florida law»; FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 4, § 2.06[2]; Liability 0/ Successor, supra note 1, § 7:1. 
24. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986); FLETCHER, supra 
note 17, § 7123.05; Liability 0/ Successor, supra note 1, § 7:21. 
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placed the defective product on the market nor represented that it 
was safe, most courts and commentators reason that it should not 
be held responsible for injuries caused by the predecessor's products.2s 
Those courts further assert that extension of successor liability would 
frustrate the legitimate needs of certainty and predictability in busi-
ness transactions because unforeseeable products liability claims com-
plicate transfers, increase transaction costs and inhibit free alienability 
of corporate assets.26 Finally, many courts conclude that post-transfer 
imposition of liability on the successor corporation defeats the benefit 
of the successor's bargain.27 
Nevertheless, courts· in recent years have been confronted with 
the argument that the "traditional rule 'runs counter to the products 
liability policy of placing the burden on the party most able to bear 
the loss by spreading the risk."'28 In an attempt to balance the 
interests of creditors and shareholders with those of products liability 
plaintiffs, some courts have adopted other approaches which expand 
the scope of corporate successor liability. The most popular ap-
proaches include the "product line" theory, the "independent duty 
to warn" theory, the "bona fide purchaser" theory and the "con-
tinuity of enterprise" theory. This casenote focuses on the continuity 
of enterprise theory but includes first a brief description of the other 
three alternative approaches. . 
Under the product line theory, a successor is held liable for the 
defective products of the predecessor if the successor acquires sub-
stantially all of the predecessor's assets, continues to produce the 
same product line under a similar name, presents itself to the public 
as a continuation of the transferor and benefits from the goodwill 
of the transferor.29 One justification for this theory is based on the 
elimination of the injured plaintiff's remedy against all but the 
successor, because in many instances the predecessor company dis-
solves shortly after the sale transaction. Additional justifications for 
the product line theory include the successor's ability to spread the 
risk and cost of product defects among future consumers and the 
equity of forcing the successor to assume the burdens associated with 
25. FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 7123.06. 
26. See Polius, 802 F.2d at 83; Liability oj Successor, supra note 1, § 7:21. 
27. See Liability oj Successor, supra note 1, § 7:21. 
28. Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D. Md. 1988) (quoting 
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, § 2.06[3] at 2-184). 
29. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10-11 (Cal. 1977) (holding that a party 
which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line 
of products assumes strict tort liability for any defects in products previously 
manufactured by the predecessor business); FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 7123.07 
(analyzing state court decisions regarding the product line theory); Liability oj 
Successor, supra note 1, § 7:25 (defining the exception based on product line 
continuation). 
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the benefits of the transferor's gocidwill. 30 The product line theory 
has been adopted in California,31 New Jersey,32 Pennsylvania33 and 
Washington.34 Most courts have rejected this theory, however, be-
cause of the absence of fault and causation on the part of the 
successor corporation and the additional constraint it places on 
business transfers. Unlike the established exceptions to the general 
rule of successor nonliability, the product line theory imposes liability 
absent any continuity in shareholders or an agreement to assume 
liability. Liability is premised on the fact that the successor holds 
itself out as a continuation of the predecessor and destroys or curtails 
consumer remedies by virtue of its acquisition. 
The independent duty to warn theory imposes liability on a 
successor corporation for failure to warn prior customers of potential 
defects in the predecessor's product when a special relationship exists 
between the successor corporation and the predecessor's customers.3S 
The requisite "special relationship" is said to exist when the successor 
takes over the predecessor's service contracts, repairs and services 
the predecessor's products and has knowledge of product defects and 
of the location of the product owner. 36 
The bona fide purchaser doctrine, like the independent duty to 
warn doctrine, is an emerging theory of successor liability that holds 
a successor accountable if it knew or should have known of its 
predecessor's defective products.37 While the established exceptions 
to the general rule of successor nonliability focus on the form of the 
transfer, the independent duty to warn and bona fide purchaser 
doctrines focus on the successor's knowledge of product defects. 
Both of these doctrines comport with the causation rationale under-
lying strict liability, and both protect successor corporations from 
the imposition of unknown liabilities. Although the successor is not 
responsible for placing the defective product on the market under 
either theory, the successor's knowledge of defects in the predeces-
sor's products and its contribution to the dissolution of the prede-
cessor indirectly cause the plaintiff's injuries and eliminate his or her 
30. See Ray, 560 P.2d at 10-11 (1977); FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 7123.07; Liability 
of Successor, supra note I, § 7:26. 
31. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977). 
32. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981). 
33. See Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. 1981). 
34. See Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P .2d 368 (Wash. 1984). 
35. Liability of Successor, supra note I, § 7:32. 
36. See FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 7123.08; FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, 
§ 2.06[5]; Liability of Successor, supra note I, § 7:33. 
37. Timothy J. Murphy, Comment, A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corporation's 
Liability for its Predecessor's Defective Products When the Successor Has 
Acquired the Predecessor's Assets for Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 848-50 
(1988). 
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recourse to the predecessor. Both theories prohibit business transfers 
that aim to destroy products liability claims by forcing either the 
predecessor or the successor to provide for potential claims. 
In addition to the four traditional exceptions,38 Alabama, Mi-
chigan, Mississippi and Ohio rec·ognize the continuity of enterprise 
exception;39 the status of this fifth exception remains uncertain in 
New York, New Hampshire and South Carolina.40 Under the conti-
nuity of enterprise theory, a successor corporation is liable for 
damages caused by the defective products of its predecessor if there 
is a "substantial continuity of pretransaction and posttransaction 
business activities resulting from the use of the acquired assets. "41 
Substantial continuity is found based on the retention of manage-
ment, personnel, physical location and assets or the manufacture of 
the same product for the same market under the same trade name, 
or both.42 Although the traditional mere continuation exception fo-
cuses on continuation of the corporate entity, the continuity of 
enterprise exception concentrates on continuation of the business 
operation or enterprise.43 Under this expanded exception, a successor 
corporation may be held liable despite a lack of continuity of 
shareholders or an agreement to the contrary between the predecessor 
and successor. 44 
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 45 a plaintiff who sustained 
injuries while using a power press brought a products liability suit 
against the corporate successor that acquired the assets of the original 
manufacturer through a cash purchase.46 The successor corporation 
retained the seller's key personnel, assets, general business operations 
and name. 47 Additionally, the successor assumed those liabilities 
ordinarily necessary for the continuation of the enterprise and the 
seller liquidated and dissolved four days after the sale.48 The purchase 
agreement required the successor to assume those liabilities reflected 
on the seller's balance sheet as of the closing date; no mention was 
made in the agreement regarding liabilities which might accrue in the 
38. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
39. Liability oj Successor, supra note 1, § 7:19 (citing cases). 
40. Liability oj Successor, supra note 1, § 7:22 (citing cases). The continuity of 
enterprise exception has been rejected in Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin. Id. (citing cases). 
41. Id. § 7:20. 
42. FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 7123.06 at 275. 
43. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, § 2.06[3]; Liability oj Successor, supra 
note I, § 7:20. 
44. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (1st Cir. 1974). 
45. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). 
46. Id. at 874-75. 
47. Id. at 874. 
48. Id. at 875-76. 
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future. 49 Espousing the continuity of enterprise doctrine, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan reversed the lower court's summary judgment for 
the defendant successor corporation.50 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan was predicated 
on its treatment of the case "first and foremost" as a products 
liability case.51 Although the traditional exceptions to successor non-
liability were developed to address creditor, shareholder and tax 
issues, Michigan's courts and legislature had not yet addressed the 
problems of products liability plaintiffs in this context.52 Owing to 
the new and evolving nature of products liability law, and the 
unsuitability of existing rules to the problems of tort victims, the 
court found it inappropriate for the traditional rules of successor 
liability to hinder the development of products liability law in this 
area. 53 The court elected to emphasize an approach to successor 
liability based on the rationale that a manufacturer is in a better 
position than a consumer to bear the cost of injury, to predict and 
insure against the risk of defective products and to improve product 
quality.54 
The court determined that the traditional rules of corporate 
successor liability were inadequate to address the needs of products 
liability plaintiffs because, regardless of the form of the corporate 
transfer,55 once the predecessor corporation becomes defunct, an 
injured person is forced to look to the successor corporation for 
restitution. 56 In a transaction involving a sale of corporate assets for 
cash, the Turner court set forth four principles necessary to establish 
a prima facie case of continuity of enterprise: 
1) There was basic continuity of the enterprise of the seller 
corporation, including, apparently, a retention of key per-
sonnel, assets, general business operations, and even the 
[predecessor's] name. 
2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business opera-
tions, liquidated, and dissolved soon after distribution of 
consideration received from the buying corporation. 
49.Id. 
50. Id. at 884. 
51. Id. at 877. 
52. Id. at 878. 
53. Id. at 877-78. 
54. Id. at 881. 
55. /d. at 883. The court reasoned that 
Id. 
it does not make sense or promote justice to require a merger and a 
defacto merger to respond to products liability suits, and then to leave 
a transfer of assets for cash free from suit, when the needs and 
objectives of both the injured party and the corporation are the same 
in all three instances. 
56. Id. at 878. 
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3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and 
obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the contin-
uation of the normal business operations of the seller cor-
poration. 
4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world 
. as the effective continuation of the seller corporationY 
155 
Where a company holds itself out as the effective continuation 
of its predecessor and benefits from its goodwill, the court indicated 
that it is unfair not to impose the burdens affiliated with the business 
on the successor. 58 Finally, the court reasoned that imposition of 
liability under the continuity of enterprise theory would not signifi-
cantly inhibit or interfere with corporate acquisitions because succes-
sor corporations are able to anticipate and accommodate products 
liability claims through "insurance, indemnification agreements or 
escrow accounts, or even a deduction from the purchase price ~ ... "59 
In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 60 after the death of the owner of a 
sole proprietorship, the employees of the company purchased the 
assets of the business for cash and held it out as an ongoing 
enterprise. The successor assumed existing service and contract ob-
ligations, purchased the goodwill of the business and provided no 
notice that a new business had been created. Finally, the purchase 
agreement specifically excluded assumption of tort liability by the 
successor. In holding the successor corporation liable for injuries 
sustained by two employees of the corporation while they were 
cleaning a printing press, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, applying New Hampshire law, focused on the continuity 
57. [d. at 883-84. 
58. [d. at 881. In Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chemicals, 518 F. Supp. 375 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1981), the district court, applying Ohio law, ruled that the successor 
could be held liable under the continuity of enterprise theory. [d. at 382. The 
court's recognition of the continuity of enterprise theory was primarily based 
on Ohio's strict liability policy of "spreading the risk of loss to all consumers 
of a product so that the product will bear the social and individual costs of 
its own defects." [d. at 381. Because the successor made a "measured business 
choice" in acquiring all assets and the benefits of good will and because it 
was better able to bear the burdens and protect itself by obtaining liability 
insurance, the court concluded that it would be unfair to permit a successor 
to avoid its predecessor's tort liabilities. Id. at 382. 
Similarly, in Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala. 
1979), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that where a successor "purposefully 
established an appearance of continuity to promote sales," it should be estopped 
from denying products liability, even though it may have an agreement with 
the predecessor to the contrary. [d. at 785. The court indicated that the 
continuity of enterprise theory was applicable to the facts in Andrews because 
under the successor, the same products were manufactured by the same people, 
in the same place and the successor attempted to benefit from the reputation 
of the seller by holding itself out as a continuation of the seller. /d. 
59. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 81B. 
60. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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of the business enterprise. 61 The traditional exceptions to successor 
liability were developed to deal with tax assessment and to promote 
fairness to creditors and freedom in business transactions.62 There-
fore, the court explained that "where tort liability is concerned, we 
should look to factors relevant to the specific claim and not be 
bound by the factors that control where other debts and liabilities 
are concerned. "63 The court discussed the policies underlying impo-
sition of strict liability on manufacturers, and noted that the same 
policies were likewise applicable to those manufacturers' successors 
which continued to manufacture and service the predecessors' prod-
ucts and which acquired the experience and expertise of the prede-
cessor.64 Because the successor knows the product, it is better able 
to gauge and manage the risk and cost of product defects and to 
improve the quality of products. 65 Also, because the successor profits 
from the seller's goodwill, it should assume the burdens associated 
with that goodwill, regardless of whether or not it placed the product 
on the market. 66 The court highlighted the fact that the same em-
ployees who were involved in the manufacture of the defective 
product continued to produce the same product in the same plant 
for the successor, in order to de-emphasize the significance of the 
change in ownership of the entity, so that it no longer served as a 
dispositive factor rendering the successor immune from liability. 67 
61. [d. at 1153-54. 
62. [d. at 1152-53. 
63. [d. 
64. [d. at 1153-54. 
65. [d. at 1154. 
66. [d. 
67. [d.; see also Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454 (D.S.C. 
1977) (relying on the reasoning of Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 
(1st Cir. 1974), to establish that the plaintiff's claim could properly be consid-
ered under the continuity of enterprise exception); cf Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. 
Corp., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985). In Mozingo, the successor continued to 
manufacture the predecessor's product, maintain service contracts and sell parts 
related to the product and promote the long history of production of the 
product. [d. at 173. The same management and employees continued to work 
for the successor in the same location. [d. The new corporation was represented 
in the management of the predecessor and "there was a substantial degree of 
identity of stockholders . . . in the sense that the [predecessor's) stock was 
simply converted to [successor] stock." [d. at 176. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's instructions 
regarding successor liability under the continuity of enterprise exception (ap-
plying Mississippi law) and held that because the same management and 
stockholders were represented in both the predecessor and successor corpora-
tions, liability was not imposed without responsibility. [d. at 175-76. The fact 
that the successor corporation was represented in the stockholders and man-
agement of the predecessor made it aware of the potential for products liability 
claims, so both predecessor and successor were in the same position to assume 
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Finally, the court stated that the "protective language in the purchase 
agreement, specifically excluding the assumption of any tort liability 
... cannot determine the rights of third parties, when no effort to 
give notice of the change was made."68 
In Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co. ,69 the Supreme 
Court of Ohio refused to adopt the product line theory because it 
represented a serious departure from the traditional exceptions to 
successor nonliability that the C01lft considered best addressed by the 
legislature. 7o Although the court also considered the expanded con-
tinuity view espoused by Turner, it found that view inapplicable 
under the facts at issue. 71 As a result, the court embraced only the 
four traditional exceptions, in contradiction with the Bonee court. 72 
The court's declaration that the mere continuation exception has been 
narrowly construed in order to protect corporations from unassumed 
liabilities, and its fear that adoption of the product line theory 
"would cast a potentially devastating burden on business transfers 
and would convert sales of corporate assets into traps for the 
unwary,"73 strongly suggest that Ohio is not willing to find liability 
beyond the established exceptions. 
The state of the law in New York with respect to the continuity 
of enterprise theory is somewhat unclear due to a split in lower court 
decisions. In Schumacher v. Richards Shear CO.,74 the Court of 
Appeals of New York discussed the continuity of enterprise doctrine 
and applied the test set forth in TurnerY The court found, however, 
that the facts before it did not warrant application of either the 
continuity of enterprise or product line exceptions, and consequently 
adopted neither theory. 76 
In Radziul v. Hooper, Inc.,77 the Monroe County Supreme Court 
interpreted Schumacher as rejecting both the product line and con-
tinuity of enterprise theories, in accord with the majority of other 
jurisdictions. 78 Based on that interpretation and the facts before it, 
the risk spreading role that underlies strict liability. [d. at 176. Lastly, consistent 
with strict liability policies, the court found that because the product did not 
leave the company until after the successor had assumed control, there was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the successor actually placed the 
product on the market. [d. at 171. 
68. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1153. 
69. 507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1987). 
70. [d. at 337. 
71. [d. at 336. 
72. See supra note 58. 
73. Flaugher, 507 N.E.2d at 337. 
74. 451 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1983). 
75. [d. at 198. 
76. [d. at 197-98. 
77. 479 N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
78. [d. at 326. See also Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848, 858 
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the court's decision focused on a discussion of successor liability in 
the duty to warn context. 79 
On the other hand, the Queens County Supreme Court in Salvati 
v. Blaw - Lenox Food & Chemical Equipment, Inc. 80 accepted the 
continuity of enterprise theory based on Turner's compelling logic.8) 
The court reasoned that because the continuity of enterprise doctrine 
was inapplicable to the facts in Schumacher, the court of appeals 
was unable to properly consider the theory. 82 Consequently, the court 
of appeals' failure to adopt the theory was not interpreted as a 
rejection of the theory, but rather as a decision to leave the issue 
open for consideration and possible adoption in a proper case.83 The 
Queens County court decided to adopt the continuity of enterprise 
theory based on its view that the holding in Turner was consistent 
with traditional tort principals; i.e., that liability was imposed on a 
successor based on its act of holding itself out as a continuation of 
the original enterprise. 84 Secondary reasons that influenced the court's 
decision include the unavailability of a remedy against the original 
manufacturer, the availability of the successor as a "deep pocket" 
to provide a remedy and to spread risk, and the fairness of forcing 
the successor to bear the burdens affiliated with the benefits of its 
asset and goodwill purchase.8s 
Finally, in Diaz v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 86 the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, relying on Cyr, 
held a successor corporation liable because it had continued the 
predecessor's general business operations in all material respects.87 
The court agreed with Cyr's reasoning that it is unfair to allow a 
successor corporation to avoid liability solely because no stock is 
transferred, when the essence of the transaction is an ongoing business 
with no change in employees, product, supervision and plant. 88 Be-
(1st Cir. 1986) (applying New York law, court concluded that the Court of 
Appeals of New York in Schumacher rejected the product line and continuity 
of enterprise theories espoused in Turner and Alad). 
79. Radz;ul, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 326. 
80. 497 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
81. [d. at 247. 
82. [d. at 245. 
83. [d. at 245-46. 
84. [d. at 247. 
85. [d. at 244-45. 
86. 707 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
87. 707 F. Supp. at 101. All of the predecessor's assets were purchased for cash. 
[d. Although the successor did not retain any of the upper-tier management 
or directors, it did hire 950/0 of the predecessor's employees, assumed manu-
facturing contracts and continued to use the same plant, designs, assets, patents 
and customer lists. [d. at 101-02. 
88. [d. at 101. 
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cause the successor incorporated the predecessor's ongoing business 
into its own, the transaction was in effect a "de-facto merger. "89 In 
addressing the liability of a subsequent successor and co-defendant, 
however, the court found no liability based on Turner's continuity 
of enterprise doctrine because the original successor continued in 
existence after the sale transaction. 90 
The principal case cited in opposition to the continuity of 
enterprise doctrine is Po/ius v. Clark Equipment CO.9J In Polius, the 
plaintiff brought suit against a successor for injuries resulting from 
an allegedly defective crane that was designed and manufactured by 
a predecessor corporation.92 .Under the sales agreement, the successor 
purchased most of the seller's assets for cash, including customer 
lists, goodwill, tradenames, trademarks and patents.93 The successor 
assumed liability for trade accounts, payroll and other contract 
obligations. On the other hand, the successor expressly rejected 
assumption of tort liabilities, and the seller agreed to indemnify the 
purchaser against all claims arising out of its operations. 94 Although 
the agreement did not require that the seller dissolve, it became a 
corporate shell within a year after the sale, and dissolved four years 
later.9S The successor continued to manufacture cranes, provide re-
placement parts to its distributors, and service machines through 
distributors.96 At the time of the plaintiff's accident, however, the 
successor was no longer manufacturing cranes.97 No officers or 
directors of the seller were retained by the successor. 98 
In Po/ius, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, applying the law of the Virgin Islands, rejected the continuity 
of enterprise theory, primarily because it disregards the causation 
requirement that is fundamental to tort law.99 Since a deterrence 
rationale underlies the causation requirement, the continuity theory 
89. [d. at 102. 
90. [d. at 102-03. 
91. 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986). 





97. [d. at 83 n.9. 
98. !d. at 76. 
99. [d. at 81-82. The Restatement of Torts requires a causal relationship between 
the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 01' TORTS 
§ 402A (1965). By imposing liability on the successor corporation, the continuity 
of enterprise theory imposes liability on an entity which has no connection 
with the acts causing the injury. Polius, 802 F.2d at 81. It is the predecessor 
which caused the harm by placing the dangerous product on the market. [d. 
at 82. 
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promotes further inconsistency by "imposing liability where deter-
rence would not be furthered. "100 Although the continuity theory is 
based on a need to compensate strict liability plaintiffs, the court 
saw "no principled distinction between victims of corporate negli-
gence and those whose recovery rests on § 402A .... "101 The fact 
that strict liability enables plaintiffs to obtain judgment without proof 
of negligence does not mean that it was necessarily implemented to 
improve a plaintiff's ability to collect on that judgment. 102 In op-
position to the notion that successor corporations are best able to 
assume the cost of product defects, the court cited significant diffi-
culties many manufacturers face in attempting to obtain products 
liability insurance, including problems with availability, affordability 
and adequacy of coverage. 103 Lastly, the court found that the con-
tinuity of enterprise doctrine concentrates exclusively on the needs 
of the products liability plaintiff while discarding the "equally valid 
arguments of the business world."I04 
In 1988, two judges of the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland, applying Maryland law, considered the conti-
nuity of enterprise doctrine in the context of two products liability 
cases. First, in Smith v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., lOS 
Judge Niemeyer, relying on the reasoning in Cyr and the lower 
court's decision in POIiUS,I06 predicted that Maryland would accept 
100. Polius, 802 F.2d at 82. 
101. Id. at 80. 
102. Id. Plaintiffs with judgments based on negligence claims have always had an 
equal right to priority as those with strict liability judgments; as such, these 
claimants are in the same situation when a company dissolves, leaving nothing 
behind to satisfy judgments. Id. The Polius court did note, however, that the 
time lag that may elapse between the time of manufacture and the resultant 
injury does present one significant distinction between strict products liability 
claims and negligence claims. Id. Since products liability claims are more likely 
than negligence claims to entail lengthy time lags between the harmful act and 
the resultant injury, product liability plaintiffs may have more difficulty col-
lecting judgments due to intervening corporate dissolution. Id. at 80-81. The 
courts adopting the continuity of enterprise theory, however, have not advanced 
this consideration. Id. at 81. 
103. Id. at 82. Additionally, the court noted that although a large corporation may 
be able to spread the cost of product liability claims over its broad customer 
base, smaller corporations are unable to do the same. Id. at 81. 
104. Id. at 83. Reasonable predictability is important in business decisions. The 
imposition of unknown liabilities on corporate successors complicates transfers, 
increases transaction costs and defeats the legitimate expectations of the parties. 
Id. 
105. 737 F. Supp. 1446 (D. Md. 1988). 
106. In Polius, the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary 
judgment on the basis of the continuity of enterprise doctrine. Polius, 802 
F.2d at 75. This grant was reversed by the decision of the third circuit court 
of appeals to reject the continuity of enterprise doctrine. Id. at 84. 
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the continuity of enterprise theory. The court was persuaded by the 
equitable concept that the substitution of one corporation for another 
manifested an intent by the successor to assume the predecessor's 
tort liability, despite an expressed intent to the contrary. 107 The court 
in Smith, however. did not hold the successor liable under the 
continuity of enterprise theory because the original manufacturer 
remained a viable entity. 108 
Second, in Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Judge Smalkin 
predicted that Maryland would reject the continuity of enterprise 
theory. In support of his prediction, Judge Smalkin noted Maryland's 
"particularly conservative" stance in the field of products liability 
law, the general policy to construe the four established exceptions 
narrowly, and limited recognition of successor liability in corporate 
matters in Maryland case law}1O 
In Miller v. Nissen Corp., the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland rejected the product line theory but adopted an expanded 
interpretation of the mere continuation exception where the "pred-
ecessor corporation is functionally extinct at the time [an] action is 
filed."111 The court seemingly adopted the continuity of enterprise 
theory based on the need to protect consumers "who [have] no 
information relative to ... internal corporate changes. "112 In revers-
ing the decision of the court of special appeals, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland adopted the four traditional exceptions to the general 
rule of successor nonliability, but refused to adopt the continuity of 
enterprise theory}l3 To assess the applicability of the rules of cor-
porate successor liability in the context of a products liability case, 
the court first examined the policies supporting Maryland's adoption 
of strict liability. 
In Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 114 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland adopted strict liability in tort as set forth in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).115 The basic justifications for strict 
107. Smith, 737 F. Supp. at 1447, 1449. 
108. The court noted that one of the key elements of the continuity of enterprise 
doctrine was the unavailability of the predecessor to be sued for its tortious 
conduct. [d. at 1451. 
109. 687 F. Supp. 987 (D. Md. 1988). 
110. [d. at 991-92. 
Ill. Miller v. Nissen Corp., 83 Md. App. 448, 456, 575 A.2d 758, 762 (1990). The 
court referred to this expanded exception as the "substantial continuation" 
exception, i.e., the continuity of enterprise. /d. at 455, 575 A.2d at 762. 
112. [d. at 457, 575 A.2d at 763 (quoting Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 
Md. App. 282, 296 n.lO, 562 A.2d 1286, 1293 n.1O (1989». 
113. Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 632, 594 A.2d 564, 573-74 (1991). 
114. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). 
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section provides: 
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
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liability are that (1) a seller has a special responsibility toward the 
consumer and (2) the seller is in the best position of all possible 
parties to take precautions against product defects and to absorb and 
protect against the cost of injuries caused by products that it man-
ufactures and markets. 1l6 Although the Phipps court found these 
reasons persuasive. it did not view strict liability as a "radical 
departure from traditional tort concepts"117 that dispenses with the 
element of fault. Instead. the court found that a seller was impliedly 
at fault when it placed a defective product on the market. 1I8 Addi-
tionally. because the seller was in a better position to guard against 
defects. it would be inequitable to force consumers to bear the costs 
of injuries as a result of their inability to meet the proof requirements 
of a negligence action. 1 19 By holding a seller accountable for placing 
a defective and unreasonably dangerous product on the market which 
injures a user, the "Restatement reaffirms the notion of a causal 
relationship between the defendant's [seller's] acts and the plaintiff's 
[user's] injury-a concept that is fundamental to tort law."120 Con-
[d. 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer. or to his property. if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product. and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product. and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
116. Miles Lab .• Inc. v. Doe. 315 Md. 704. 717. 556 A.2d 1107. 1114 (1989); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965). 
117. Phipps. 278 Md. at 351-52. 363 A.2d at 963. See Nissen. 323 Md. at 622-23. 
594 A.2d at 568-69; Miles Lab., Inc .• 315 Md. at 717. 556 A.2d at 1113; Harig 
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp .• 284 Md. 70. 83-84. 394 A.2d 299. 306-07 
(1978). 
118. Phipps. 278 Md. at 351. 363 A.2d at 955. 
119. Id. at 352. 363 A.2d at 963. The court reasoned that 
the seller is not an insurer. as absolute liability is not imposed on the 
seller for any injury resulting from the use of his product. Proof of 
a defect in the product at the time it leaves the control of the seller 
implies fault on the part of the seller sufficient to justify imposing 
liability for injuries caused by the product. 
Id. (citations omitted). See also Harig. 284 Md. at 83-84. 394 A.2d at 307 
("'[T]he major distinction between an action in strict liability in tort and one 
founded on traditional negligence theory relates to the proof which must be 
presented by the plaintiff. .. ·) (quoting Phipps, 278 Md. at 350-51. 363 A.2d 
at 962). 
120. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co .• 802 F.2d 75. 81 (3d CiT. 1986). 
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sequently, the concepts of fault and causation are inherent in Mar-
yland's strict products liability policy. 
The absence of a causal relationship between Nissen and the 
alleged harm was pivotal to the court's decision.12l Based on the 
facts, Nissen was not the seller and was not responsible for bringing 
the defective product and the plaintiff together. 122 The court also 
concluded that extension of liability under the continuity of enterprise 
theory would frustrate the need for stability and predictability in 
business transactions because unforeseeable products liability claims 
discourage corporate transfers and acquisitions. ~23 The court rejected 
the argument that a successor corporation should be held liable 
because it benefits from the goodwill of the predecessor, finding 
instead that when a predecessor's defective products cause injuries, 
the successor will "suffer a resultant loss in the value of the goodwill 
it purchased."I24 Because the successor loses some of the benefit of 
. its original bargain, further imposition of liability for the predeces-
sor's product defects would be inequitable. 125 
Because it emphasized the causation requirement inherent in 
strict liability law, the court accepted much of the rationale advanced 
in Polius. 126 Like the Polius court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
dismissed the notion of the successor as a "deep pocket" that was 
best able to bear the burden of product defects by assuming the risk-
spreading role and protecting itself with liability insurance. 127 Con-
sistent with Polius, the court also concluded that well established 
corporate law policies deserve at least as much merit as the evolving 
strict products liability policies and concerns. This finding is evident 
in the court's attack on the Turner decision, where it stated "[w]e 
do not agree that traditional rules of successor liability should be 
'shaken off' as 'impediments.'"128 This tendency to discard corporate 
law principles and focus exclusively on strict liability concerns was a 
significant factor in the court's rejection of the rationale in Cyr, 
Turner and their progeny. The predominant reason for the court's 
121. See Nissen, 323 Md. at 624, 633, 594 A.2d at 569, 574. 
122. Id. at 625, 594 A.2d at 570. 
123. Id. at 624 n.2, 594 A.2d at 569 n.2. 
124. Id. at 629, 594 A.2d at 570. 
125. Because the successor pays for the predecessor's goodwill in the asset transfer, 
subsequently discovered product defects diminish the benefit of the successor's 
bargain by damaging the company's reputation, the product's reputation, or 
both. Therefore, holding a successor liable for the defective products of its 
predecessor serves as a double penalty against the successor. See Murphy, 
supra note 37, at 835·36. 
126. Nissen, 323 Md. at 627, 594 A.2d at 571. 
127. Id. at 624·25, 594 A.2d at 569·70. 
128. Id. at 629, 594 A.2d at 572 (quoting Turner v. Bituminous Gas Co., 244 
N.W.2d 873, 877 (Mich. 1976». 
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rejection of such cases was, however, their disregard for the funda-
mental concept of fault inherent in tort law. 129 
The court's holding is consistent with the majority position and 
with Maryland's strict liability policy, which requires some degree of 
fault, i.e., a causal relationship between a defendant's acts and a 
plaintiff's injuries. 130 The court's decision was well-reasoned because 
corporate law policies and strict liability policies each present equally 
valid concerns that must be balanced by the court. Just as it is unfair 
to destroy a plaintiff's remedy through a corporate transfer of assets, 
it is equally unfair to deny a purchasing corporation the benefit of 
its bargain through the imposition of unanticipated liabilities. 
None of the alternative theories of successor liability directly 
apply to the factual circumstances at issue in the case. Inconsistent 
with the continuity of enterprise exception, the seller corporation did 
not cease ordinary business operations, liquidate and dissolve soon 
after the asset transfer. In fact, the transferor was required by 
agreement to remain in business for at least five years after the 
transfer in order to indemnify the successor from product liability. 
Also, the successor relocated the transferor's business, retained only 
a few of the transferor's employees, and notified its dealers of the 
acquisition. 13I Contrary to the product line theory, the successor's 
acquisition of the transferor's assets did not destroy the injured 
plaintiff's recourse to the predecessor, and the injured plaintiff was 
notified of the acquisition. 132 Lastly, neither the independent duty to 
warn nor the bona fide purchaser theories apply under the circum-
stances at issue because there was no evidence that the successor 
corporation had any knowledge of defects in the predecessor's prod-
uctS.133 
Although the court considered the societal value of allowing a 
consumer to recover for his injuries, it stressed the unfairness of 
requiring a successor to bear the cost of "unassumed and uncontem-
plated products liability claims primarily because it is still in business 
and is perceiv,ed as a 'deep pocket." ' 134 The court, however, failed 
to consider what remedies, if any, remain for an injured consumer 
when the successor's acquisition later eliminates the predecessor and 
destroys the ability of the injured party to seek redress from the 
party actually responsible for the defective product. In Nissen, one 
might reasonably expect that after the passage of the required five 
year indemnification period, the successor corporation should be 
129. [d. at 633, 594 A.2d at 574. 
130. [d. at 623, 633, 594 A.2d at 569, 574. 
131. [d. at 616, 594 A.2d at 565. 
132. [d. at 626, 594 A.2d at 570. 
133. [d. at 626 n.3, 594 A.2d at 570 n. 3. 
134. [d. at 624, 594 A.2d at 569. 
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subject to liability. Just as the four established exceptions protect 
creditors and shareholders by precluding a change in corporate struc-
ture that permits a corporation to escape debts and liabilities, the 
law should protect products liability plaintiffs by precluding any 
manipulation of corporate structure which circumvents future prod-
ucts liability claims. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Nissen 
Corp. v. Miller reaffirms Maryland's conservative stance with respect 
to products liability law 13s and reinforces Maryland's strict liability 
policy which requires fault in order to impose tort liability. 136 Rec-
ognition of only the traditional exceptions to the general rule of 
successor nonliability, on the other hand, fails to respond to the 
legitimate interests of products liability plaintiffs. To protect products 
liability plaintiffs from the elimination of remedies, and successor 
corporations from the imposition of unknown liabilities, Maryland 
should consider adoption of the independent duty to warn and bona' 
fide purchaser theories. Both of these theories comport with the 
causation rationale of Maryland's strict liability policies and with its 
corporate law policies. 
It is inappropriate to allow products liability law to develop in 
this context on a case-by-case basis in the courts, because such a 
policy promotes inconsistent results and forces the courts to give 
preferred consideration to one -of two equally important areas of 
law. The issue would be best addressed by the legislature137 through 
a statutory standard that requires business entities to accommodate 
future products liability claims and imposes liability by default if the 
parties fail to meet the standard. 
Donna M.D. MacDonald 
135. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
136. See supra notes Il4-18 and accompanying text. 
137. Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ohio 1987). 
